Turkish analyst's view on the prospects for relations with Russia
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Having been bonded by history, culture, as well as geographical proximity, Turkey and Russia plays a very significant role in shaping the geographies of their respective regions. The Russian and Turkish relations date back centuries. Over the years, their historical, political, cultural and economic ramifications have affected one another and much of the civilized world to a considerable extent. It is therefore essential to first examine the history between these two peoples to at least somewhat better understand the present-day relations and, even more so, to anticipate how they may evolve in the future.
Although nomadic Turks interacted with Slavic tribes for millennia throughout history and left indelible marks on each other’s traditions, culture and mentality, it is beyond the scope of this article to cover this understudied topic. To that end, Ottoman – Muscovite relations will be regarded as the starting point in this article. As has been done in the past by most historians writing about the Russian – Ottoman relations, one could easily list the numerous conflicts and clashes between the two empires and their consequences. Compared to ordinary diplomatic interactions and trade ties, points of conflict seem far more interesting to the general public. Historians also tend to look for potential areas of conflict between nations or groups of people with different cultural and religious orientations, even when those issues were nonexistent or inconsequential.
A superficial examination of the Ottoman Empire and Muscovite Russia, particularly in the 16th and 17th centuries, would certainly indicate an ideal setting for conflict. The claim to be «the Third Rome after which there would be no Fourth» was taken seriously in Muscovy, the bastion of militant Orthodoxy. Her Grand Princes, who would later become Tsars, gradually expanded Moscow’s domain into Asia and the Caucasus while merging Islamic/Turkic states into her Empire. The Ottomans, on the other hand, started as a beylik whose primary objective was to conquer regions of mainly Orthodox Christians, especially in southeast Europe.
Both the Ottoman and Russian Empires became major powers in the sixteenth century, with Sultan Suleiman I conquering and solidifying his rule in the Danube region and Tsar Ivan IV advancing with success against the Muslim kingdoms of Kazan and Astrakhan. The Tsar, and others at the time, wrote about how he was divinely chosen to defend Orthodox Christians and vanquish their foes. Like other Caliphs before him, Suleiman I was responsible for protecting the Islamic faith and its followers while also pursuing territorial expansion at the expense of ‘infidels’. It’s hard to imagine two such people, who were virtually right next to each other, could manage to avoid becoming adversaries. The predicament was exacerbated by the instability of the Ottoman-Muscovite border.
The steppes to the north of the Black Sea were a natural target for rivalry between the two expansionist powers encircling it, as it was inhabited by Cossacks, Turkic nomads, and the Crimean Khanate, all of whom were not subject to any enduring political authority (until 17th century). Similarly, the Caucasian region was home to a mosaic of peoples whose allegiances shifted as they were influenced by the advancements of more powerful neighbors. Despite this, Muscovy and the Ottoman Empire historically maintained courteous and friendly ties.
Up until Peter I seized the Ottoman trading hub of Azov between 1695 and 1700, neither side engaged in any significant conflict with the other. The Ottomans were careful to not launch any direct assaults against the northern regions. Although, fights certainly occurred frequently along the border between the two nations, it was mainly due to tensions between the Crimean Tatars and the Cossacks of the Don and Zaporogian regions. The Tatars frequently attacked Polish and Ukrainian farmers in the steppe region for plunder and prisoners, but the Ottomans denied responsibility for these events. The Cossacks retaliated by plundering Ottoman territory, especially along the Black Sea shore. Similarly, the Tsar denied any responsibility for the actions of the Cossacks.
Much of the 16th and 17th centuries, therefore, were marked not by animosity but by commerce and ordinary diplomacy. The Crimean port of Kaffa and the Azov Strait were significant centers for north-south commerce that benefited both Moscow and Constantinople. Many villages in the Black Sea region served as hubs for the mutual trade of food, furs, leather, and a wide variety of metal products. At the close of the sixteenth century, Azov was home to traders from all over the world, including Safavid Iran, Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and even western Europe. Most diplomatic discussions centered on issues relating to commerce such as tariffs, the rights of merchants operating within each other’s lands, and the impact of the unilateral actions of the Tatars and the Cossacks. On occasion, there were proposals for alliances between the two empires against mutual enemies, albeit they rarely came to fruition.
These two centuries of diplomacy, trade, mutual respect and understanding stemmed from a variety of factors. To start with, the governmental structures of both regimes were remarkably similar. Once the specific religious phraseology was removed, it was even difficult to distinguish one from the other. Secondly, each had joined the power politics of the day, where adversaries of one were frequently also the enemies of the other. Thirdly, the Tsars had Muslims residing under their rule beginning in 1555, just as the Ottomans had Orthodox Christian subjects. The Sultan and the Tsar appeared to have an understanding of the extreme political and religious formalism that governed the other’s behaviors, a formalism so different from that practiced in the West. Although this deep understanding between two peoples enabled relatively good relations for a few generations, empires this big and ambitious were bound to clash sooner or later in the geopolitical atmosphere of the 18th and 19th centuries.
To be continued …
